We investigate derandomizations of digital good randomized auctions. We propose a general derandomization method which can be used to show that for every random auction there exists a deterministic auction having asymptotically the same revenue. In addition, we construct an explicit optimal deterministic auction for bi-valued auctions.
Aggarwal et al. [1, 2] later showed how to construct from any randomized auction a deterministic, asymmetric auction with approximately the same revenue. In order to establish the result the authors used guessing auctions, in which the bidder gets the good only if the price equals exactly the bid (rather than lower or equal, as in a the standard setting). The guessing auctions are then "solved" using a hat guessing game which they introduce. Therefore for every random auction a deterministic "dual" auction can be constructed, though not in polynomial time, where the deterministic one guarantees a revenue which is close to the expected revenue of the random auction. Following is a more formal claim of their result: given a randomized auction A which accepts bid-vectors in [1, h] n , there exists a deterministic, asymmetric auction A D satisfying P A D (b) ≥ P A (b)/4 − O(h) for every b ∈ [1, h] n ; here P A D (b) is the revenue of A D given a bid-vector b and P A (b) is the expected revenue of A given a bid-vector b. The same result also holds in the more restrictive case where A accepts only discrete bid-vectors in [h] n . In addition, Aggarwal et al. showed that if the bid-vectors are restricted to be vectors of powers of 2 then the multiplicative factor of 4 above can be improved to 2.
Our Results
We show how to eliminate the multiplicative factor of 4. We use Lovász's Local Lemma [11] to show that for every random auction there exists a deterministic auction that guarantees the expected revenue of the random one, on any bid vector. More formally, for a randomized auction A and bid vector b let P A (b) be the expected revenue of A on b. We show that given a random auction A, there exists a deterministic auction which, given a bid-vector b ∈ [h] n , guarantees a revenue of P A (b) − O(h √ n ln hn). As is the case with the construction of Aggarwal et al. [1] , our construction is also not polynomial time computable.
For bi-valued auctions, with bid values {1, h} and n bidders, we show a polynomial time deterministic auction, for which we guarantee a revenue of max {n, h · n h } − O( √ n · h), where n h is just the number of bidders that bid h. We then show that this bound is unconditionally optimal by showing that every auction (including a random superpolynomial one), cannot guarantee more than max{n, h · n h } − Ω( √ n · h). That is, there exists an auction with no multiplicative loss and with only O( √ n · h) additive loss, and every auction has at-least these losses. Let us note here, that if we restrict ourselves to anonymous auctions (symmetric) then we have a multiplicative loss of Ω(h) and an additive loss of Ω(n/h) over the max {n, h · n h } revenue of the best offline [2, 15] .
In order to find a polynomial time deterministic auction for bi-valued auctions, we solve a certain hat guessing puzzle. Hat guessing games is an emerging research field in combinatorics. It was broadly brought to the attention of researchers by a work of Peter Winkler [27] , and since then was studied in many works such as [3, [8] [9] [10] 12] . The beautiful work of Aggarwal et al. [2] established a connection between hat guessing games and unlimited supply, unit demand, single item auctions. In fact, the authors introduced three different hat games and used them to establish their derandomizations. We show how a different hat game can help in forming an answer to the bi-valued auctions setting. This hat game was previously studied by Doerr and by Feige [9, 12] . Our deterministic hat strategy improves Doerr's result and answers an open question of Feige.
Consider the following game. There are n players, each wearing a hat colored red or blue. Each player does not see the color of its own hat but does see the colors of all other hats. Simultaneously, each player has to guess the color of its own hat, without communicating with the other players. The players are allowed to meet beforehand, hats-off, in order to coordinate a strategy. We give a polynomial time deterministic strategy which guarantees that the number of correct guesses is at least max{n r , n b } − O(n 1/2 ), where n r is the number of players with a red hat and n b = n − n r is the number of players with a blue hat.
Additive Loss
Already in the work that suggested using competitive analysis, namely Goldberg et al. [17] , a major obstacle arises. It was indicated that no auction can be competitive against bids with one high value (see Goldberg et al. [15] for details). The first solution that was suggested to this problem was taking a different benchmark as the offline auction. This different benchmark was again the maximum single price auction, only now the number of winning bidders is bounded to be at-least two. The term competitive was then used to indicate an auction that has a constant ratio on every bid vector against any single price auction that sells at-least two items. A few random competitive auctions were indeed suggested using this definition over the years, but, as noted before, no deterministic (asymmetric) auction was ever found. In fact, this was proved not to be a coincidence when Aggarwal et al. [1] showed that no deterministic auction can be competitive even on this weaker benchmark.
Given this lower bound a new solution should be considered, and indeed Aggarwal et al. [1] suggested such. The new definition suggested generalizing the competitive notion to include also additive losses on top of the multiplicative ones considered before.
We argue that our results, and in particular the auction and the tight lower bound for the bi-valued setting, indicate that this second approach of considering also the additive loss is more accurate, as it shows how analyzing with a finer granularity turns an uncompetitive auction to an optimal one. We elaborate on this agenda in the discussion section 5.
Organization
After a short preliminaries section we introduce our general derandomization on section 3. Section 4 presents the deterministic polynomial time algorithm for bi-valued auctions together with a tight lower bound that applies even for random auctions. It starts, however, in the presentation of the new deterministic hat guessing bound that serves as a building block for the auction. We conclude with closing remarks and open problems in section 5.
Preliminaries
For a natural number k, let [k] denote the set {1, 2, ..., k}. A bid-vector b ∈ [h] n is a vector of n bids, each taking a value in [h] . For b ∈ [h] n and i ∈ [n] we denote by b −i the vector which is the result of replacing the ith bid in b with a question mark; that is, b −i is the vector
Definition 1 (Unlimited supply, unit demand, single item auction). An unlimited supply, unit demand, single item auction is a mechanism in which there is one item of unlimited supply to sell by an auctioneer to n bidders. The bidders place bids for the item according to their valuation of the item. The auctioneer then sets prices for every bidder. If the price for a bidder is lower than or equal to its bid, then the bidder is considered as a winner and gets to buy the item for its price. A bidder with price higher than its bid does not pay nor gets the item. The auctioneer's revenue is the sum of the winners prices.
A truthful auction is an auction in which every bidder bids its true valuation for the item. Truthfulness can be established through bid-independent auctions (see for example [22] ). A bidindependent auction is an auction for which the auctioneer computes the price for bidder i using only the vector b −i (that is, without the ith bid). Two models have been proposed for describing random truthful auctions. The first, being the truthful in expectation, refers to auctions for which a bidder maximizes its expected utility by bidding truthfully. The second model, the universally truthful is merely a probability distribution over deterministic auctions. Our results uses this second definition, however, it is known that the two models collide in this setting [21] .
Definition 2 (fixed price, offline auction). The fixed price, offline auction is the auction that on each bid vector b ∈ [h] n fixes a single price, α = α(b) for all bidders, so to maximize the revenue given that price. Namely, α is chosen such that b i ≥α α is maximized.
Definition 3 (General competitive auction). Let OP T (b) be the best fixed-price (offline) revenue for an n-bid vector b with maximum bid h. An auction A is a general competitive auction if its revenue (expected revenue) from every bid vector b,
where α is a constant not depending on n or h.
A structural lemma
Let A be a randomized truthful auction that accepts bid-vectors from [h] n . We think of A as a distribution over deterministic auctions. Hence, we may view A's execution in the following manner. The auction maintains a set of nm functions {g i,j :
. This corresponds to a collection of m deterministic auctions, where the jth is defined by the set of functions 
Note that for every j ∈ [m], the set of functions {g i,j | i ∈ [n]} is just a deterministic strategy, denoted A j , and A is, as explained before, a distribution on deterministic strategies.
Note also that given A, namely the set of m deterministic auctions, and a distribution, D = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) on [m], A induces another randomized auction A as follows: for a given b, it chooses for each i ∈ [n], independently, a j i ∈ [m] according to D (namely ∀i, P r(j i = j) = p j ), and acts according to the set of functions thus chosen, namely {g i,j i , i = 1, . . . , n}.
By definition, the expected revenue of A on input b is given by:
We call A the bidder-self-randomness-dual of A (as the function for different bidders are "not coordinated"). Comparing the revenue of A and that of A immediately implies Lemma 2.1. Let A be a randomized auction and A be its bidder-self-randomness-dual auction. Then A and A have the same expected revenue on every bid-vector.
This corresponds with the minimax Theorem [26] and with Yao's Lemma [28] . We note that A is concentrated on possibly many more deterministic algorithms than A. Not only may g 1 be chosen from the jth copy while g 2 from the 's copy, (namely g 1 = g 1,j while g 2 = g 2, with j = ), it could also be that for different bid vectors b, b , g 1 for b is g 1,j while g 1 for b is g 1, . This works since no consistency requirement between different b's, and/or different i's, is required in the expression for the expectation above.
Probabilistic Tools
The following two well known lemmata are used in the proofs. We explicitly state both for completeness. The first is just the famous Lovász Local Lemma [11] . We will need the following version of it [4] . Lemma 2.2 (The local lemma; symmetric case). Let Bad i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , be events in an arbitrary probability space. Suppose that each event Bad i is mutually independent of a set of all the other events Bad j but at most d, and that
where e is the base of the natural logarithm, then Pr[
The second lemma is just a tail bound inequality proved by Hoeffding [19] .
Lemma 2.3 (Hoeffding)
. Let X be the average of n independent random variables X i , where
A General Derandomization
This section is devoted for the proof of the following Theorem.
Theorem 3.1. Let A be a randomized auction which accepts bid-vectors in [h] n . Assume that A has expected revenue P A (b) for every bid-vector b ∈ [h] n . Then there exists a deterministic auction
The proof of Theorem 3.1 can be outlined as follows. Given a randomized auction A we first move to the bidder-self-randomness-dual auction A that has the same revenue as A. Let A D be a deterministic auction that is chosen according to the distribution that A induces on deterministic auctions. We show that the event Bad b , defined by P A D (b) < P A (b) − t, depends on a relatively few number of other events Bad b . Moreover, for every b, we have that the probability of Bad b is sufficiently small. We then apply the Lovász Local Lemma to show that there exists a single deterministic auction A D , namely a choice of a collection of functions {g i,j i , i ∈ [n]}, for which none of the events Bad b occur. This will conclude the proof of the theorem.
We stress the fact that the result of Aggarwal et al. [1] is more general in the sense that it deals with bid-vectors in [1, h] n , while Theorem 3.1 only deals with discrete bid-vectors. However, discrete bid-vectors make sense in real life auctions where bids are monetary bids, being made with discrete valued currency. We stipulate that the construction used in the proof of Theorem 3.1 is not known to be polynomial time computable and that this is also the case in the construction of Aggarwal et al. [1] .
We now formally present the proof.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let A be a randomized auction which accepts bid-vectors in [h] n , using a distribution over m deterministic auctions. Let {g i,j : i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m]} be the set of functions that A maintains. Let (p 1 , . . . , p n ) be the distribution over [m] that is used by A, and let A be the bidder-self-randomness-dual of A. Namely, in which for each b, g i is chosen independently for each i, among all g i,j , j ∈ [m], with the corresponding probabilities {p j , j ∈ [m]}.
For every vector b let P A (b) be the revenue expected by A on b. By Lemma 2.1, the revenue of A on a bid vector b is
In the following, all events are with respect to the distribution defined by the runs of the random auction A . Namely, the probability space contains, for each bid vector b, an n-tuple of independently chosen values (g i,j ) i∈[n] as defined above by A .
Let t := h √ n ln 2hn. For a random run of A , namely, for a deterministic auction A D that is chosen at random according to the distribution induced by A on deterministic auctions, let Bad b be the event that
We need the following two claims.
Proof. Fix b ∈ [h] n and let X i be the revenue extracted from bidder i in a run of A , namely, for
for all i and that the X i 's are independent random variables. Let X be the sum of the X i 's. Namely, X is the revenue on b for that specific run. We have already argued that E[X] = P A (b), thus,
which by Lemma 2.3 is at most 2 exp −2t 2 h 2 n . The claim now follows since t = h √ n ln 2hn. 
This completes the proof of the theorem.
Bi-valued Auctions and a Hat Game
We establish a connection between bi-valued auctions and a specific hat guessing game known as the majority hat game. This game was studied by Doerr [9] and later by Feige [12] . We derive new results regarding this game, which enable us to solve the bi-valued auction problem optimally.
A Hat Game
A group of n players is gathered, n r of which wear a red hat and n b = n − n r wear a blue hat. Every player in the group can see the colors of the hats of the other players, but cannot see and does not know the color of its own hat, a color which has been picked by an adversary. No form of communication is allowed between the players. At the mark of an unseen force, each player simultaneously guesses the color of its hat. The objective of the players as a group is to make the total number of correct guesses as large as possible. In order to achieve this goal, the players are allowed to meet beforehand, hats-off, and agree upon some strategy.
Theorem 4.1. There exists a polynomial time deterministic strategy which guarantees at least max{n r , n b } − O(n 1/2 ) correct guesses.
Let us give a few remarks. First, this result is optimal, in the sense that any deterministic strategy can guarantee only max{n r , n b } − Ω(n 1/2 ) correct guesses in the worst case; this was proved by Feige [12] and Doerr [9] . Second, this result improves a result of Doerr [9] who gave a polynomial time deterministic strategy which guarantees at least max{n r , n b } − O(n 2/3 ) correct guesses, and a result of Feige [12] who gave a non-polynomial time deterministic strategy which guarantees at least max{n r , n b } − O(n 1/2 ) correct guesses. Feige further asked whether there exists a polynomial time deterministic strategy which guarantees this last bound, and our result answers this question affirmatively. Lastly it should be noted that Winkler [27] , who brought the problem to light, gave a simple polynomial time deterministic strategy which guarantees n/2 correct guesses.
The proof of Theorem 4.1 has two parts. First, we design a polynomial time randomized strategy for the players, a strategy which guarantees that under any hat assignment, the expected number of correct guesses is max{n r , n b } − O(n 1/2 ). We then derandomize this strategy by giving a polynomial time deterministic strategy that always achieves, up to another O(n 1/2 ) additive loss, the expected number of correct guesses of the randomized strategy.
Randomized strategy
Let the players agree in advance on some ordering so that the ith player is well defined and known to all. Under a given hat assignment, let χ r (i) be the number of red hats that the ith player sees. Analogously, let χ b (i) be the number of blue hats that the ith player sees. Say that a player is red (respectively blue) if she wears a red (respectively blue) hat.
Our strategy is a collection of randomized strategies, one for each player. We describe the strategy of the ith player, Paula. First Paula computes two positive integers a(i) and b(i), and sets p(i) = a(i)/b(i). If |χ r (i) − χ b (i)| ≤ 1, then Paula takes a(i) = 1 and b(i) = 2, so that p(i) = 1/2. Otherwise, |χ r (i) − χ b (i)| ≥ 2 and so we have either χ r (i) = n/2 + c for some c > 0 or χ b (i) = n/2 + c for some c > 0 (but not both). In the former case Paula takes a(i) = min{ n 1/2 , c } and b(i) = n 1/2 , so that p(i) = min{1, c / n 1/2 } and in the latter case she takes a(i) = n 1/2 − min{ n 1/2 , c } and b(i) = n 1/2 , so that p(i) = 1 − min{1, c / n 1/2 }. Note that a(i), b(i) and p(i) can be computed in polynomial time. Having p(i) at hand, Paula draws a uniformly random real p in the unit interval, guesses red if p ≤ p(i) and blue otherwise. Proof. We shall assume throughout the proof that n r ≥ n b ; the argument for the other case is symmetric. We consider the following cases.
• n r = n b . In that case, every player guesses correctly with probability 1/2. Thus the expected number of correct guesses is max{n r , n b }.
• n r ∈ {n b + 1, n b + 2}. In that case, every red player guesses red with probability 1/2 and every blue player guesses blue with probability 1 − O(n −1/2 ). Thus, the expected number of correct guesses is n r /2 + n b (1 − O(n −1/2 )), which is clearly at least max{n r , n b } − O(n 1/2 ).
• n r ≥ n b + 3. In the last case we examine the gap between n r and n/2. If this gap is small ( √ n) then enough blue players will guess blue. Otherwise enough red players will guess red. Formally, let x > 1 satisfy n r = n/2+x, so that n b = n/2−x. First assume that x ≤ n 1/2 . In that case, every red player guesses red with probability x − 1 / n 1/2 = ( x − 1)/ n 1/2 , and every blue player guesses blue with probability 1 − x / n 1/2 . Therefore, the expected number of correct guesses is
which is at least max{n r , n b } − O(n 1/2 ), since max{n r , n b } ≤ n/2 + O(n 1/2 ). Next assume that x > n 1/2 . In that case, every red player guesses its hat correctly with probability 1 and so the expected number of correct guesses is at least n r ≥ max{n r , n b } − O(n 1/2 ).
Derandomization
The randomized strategy we gave above has two phases. In the first phase the ith player computes in deterministic polynomial time some number p(i) in the unit interval. Moreover, the strategy is symmetric namely, for some p r and p b that depend only on the number of red hats and the number of blue hats, we have p(i) = p r if the ith player is red and p(i) = p b if the ith player is blue. Given the first phase, the second phase guarantees that the expected number of correct guesses is p r n r + (1 − p b )n b , which was shown by Lemma 4.2 to be at least max{n r , n b } − O(n 1/2 ). We show in the following that, if for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n the ith player has determined p(i), we can replace the second phase of the randomized strategy by a non-symmetric, polynomial time, deterministic strategy which guarantees that at least p r n r − O(n 1/2 ) red players make a correct guess and at least (1 − p b )n b − O(n 1/2 ) blue players make a correct guess. By Lemma 4.2 this will imply Theorem 4.1.
Suppose that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the ith player has determined a(i), b(i) and p(i). The following is the strategy that the ith player follows in order to determine its guess.
1. Let X(i) = j j, where the sum ranges over all j = i such that the jth player is red.
2. Let Y (i) = j 1, where the sum ranges over all j < i such that the jth player is red.
Let Z(i)
= i + X(i) + (b(i) − 1)Y (i) (mod b(i)).
Guess red if Z(i) < a(i), blue otherwise.
Note that the above deterministic strategy can be implemented so that its running time is polynomial in n. This fact together with the next lemma proves Theorem 4.1.
Lemma 4.3.
Suppose that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the ith player has computed a(i), b(i) and p(i). If each player follows the above strategy, then the number of red players that make a correct guess is at least p r n r − O(n 1/2 ) and the number of blue players that make a correct guess is at least
Proof. In what follows we make use of the following facts, which follow from the definition of a(i) and b(i) in the previous section. If the ith player and the jth player both have a hat of the same color, then a(i) = a(j) and
Let us first consider the red players. Let 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n be two indices of players so that the ith player's hat and the jth player's hat are both red and furthermore, for all i < k < j we have that the kth player's hat is blue. Let a(i) = a(j) = a and b(i) = b(j) = b so that p r = a/b. We have i + X(i) = j + X(j) and Y (j) − Y (i) = 1. Thus Z(j) − Z(i) = b − 1 (mod b). This implies that out of each b consecutive red players, a guess red. Thus, since b ≤ 2n 1/2 , at least p r n r − O(n 1/2 ) red players guess red.
Next consider the blue players. Let 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n be two indices of players so that the ith player's hat and the jth player's hat are both blue and furthermore, for all i < k < j we have that the kth player's hat is red. Let a(i) = a(j) = a and
. This implies that out of each b consecutive blue players, b − a guess blue. Thus, since b ≤ 2n 1/2 , at least (1 − p b )n b − O(n 1/2 ) blue players guess blue.
A Bi-valued Auction
Consider bi-valued auctions, in which there are n bidders, each can select a value from {1, h}. The auction's revenue equals the number of bidders it offers 1 plus h times the number of bidders it offers h if indeed their value is h. Let n h (b) denote the number of bidders who bids h in a bid vector b. Recall that the best offline revenue on vector b is max {n, h · n h (b)}. In this section we will prove the following. 
2. There is no auction that for all bid vector b has revenue
Note that the lower bound result is unconditional and applies also for randomized superpolynomial auctions. We proceed with a proof for the upper bound in the next section and a proof for the lower bound in section 4.2.2.
An Auction
We present next a solution to the bi-valued auction problem, namely we show an optimal polynomial time deterministic auction. We start again by describing a random auction. A derandomization will be built later using the same methods we presented in the former section for the hat guessing problem.
A Random Bi-valued Auction
For a fixed input b, let n h be the number of h-bids in b and n h (i) be the number of h-bids in b −i . Let
The auction offers value h for bidder i with probability p(i) and 1 otherwise.
Lemma 4.5. The expected revenue of the auction described above is max {n,
≤ n so the auction will offer 1 to any 1-bidder and the revenue will be at-least n = max {n, h · n h }, or h · n h (i) − n ≥ h · n h (i) so every h-bidder will be offered h with probability 1 − O(1/ √ n h ) and the expected revenue thus is
revenue for any bid vector with n h bids of value h is then:
Observe that the sum of the first two terms in the last expression above is max {n,
The third term however, can be absorbed also into the O( √ n · h), which completes the proof of the lemma.
Hence our auction's expected revenue is within an additive loss of O( √ n · h) from the revenue of the best offline as promised. As noted before, a derandomization for this auction can be built using the same ideas appeared in the hat guessing game. This derandomization produces an auction which has for the worst case only another additive loss of O( √ n · h) over the expected revenue of the random auction. Hence, in total, an additive loss of O( √ n · h) over the best offline revenue is achieved. We sketch this derandomization here for completeness.
Derandomization
Let a(i) = h · n h (i) − n and b(i) = h · n h (i). The auction computes the value offered to bidder i according to the following. Note that for the random auction whenever p(i) = p (i) (or as stated here a(i)/b(i) ∈ [0, 1]) we can define the probability that a 1-bidder will be offered 1,
), the probability that an h-bidder will be offered 1,
) and the probability that an h-bidder will be
. The proof of the following lemma resembles the proof of lemma 4.3, noting that we should also consider the case of "wrong" offers for h-bidders. Lemma 4.6. An auction that follows the above formulation gains revenue of
Proof. Let a(1) be the (identical) value a(i) computed by all 1-bidders. In the same manner let b(1), a(h), b(h) be the (identical) values computed by all bidders. The lemma follows Lemma 4.5 and the following claim:
Claim 4.7.
• For every b(1) consecutive 1-bidders the auction will offer h to a(1) of them and 1 to b(1)−a(1)
• For every b(h) consecutive h-bidders the auction will offer h to a(h) of them and
Proof. Consider the h-bidders first. Let 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n be the indices of two consecutive h-bidders.
. This implies that out of each b(h) consecutive h-bidders, a(h) will be offered h and b(h) − a(h) will be offered 1.
Next consider the 1-bidders. Let 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n be the indices of two consecutive 1-bidders. We have X(i) = X(j) and 1 (mod b(1) ). This implies that out of each b(1) consecutive 1-bidders, b(1) − a(1) are offered 1.
It is clear that this auction can be implemented in polynomial time as claimed, hence the upper bound of Theorem 4.4 follows.
Informal Remark: A natural critic that should arise at first glance of our "complicated" suggested auction is its being "unintuitive". How can one explain/excuse suboptimal actions whenever n h = n/h? Why not deploy DOP in these settings? Note, however, that the proposed auction does exactly the same. On most inputs it acts as the DOP and only on inputs where n h ≈ n/h it deploys the "sophisticated" auction. In particular, the auction "sacrifices the accuracy" of results whenever for the bid vector b we have that n ≤ hn h (b) ≤ n + h n h (b). This "sophisticated sacrifice", however, results in turning an unbounded competitive auction into an optimal one.
A Lower Bound
We prove optimality of the suggested auction in the previous section. For this we prove a lower bound on the additive loss of any bi-valued auction. The lower bound is unconditional and holds also for the expected revenue of random auctions. Furthermore, the bound does not depend on the computation time needed for the auction, therefore, randomness has no significant effect on the revenue gained in this setting.
Lemma 4.8. Let A be an auction for the bi-valued {1, h} setting and let P A (b) be A's revenue on bid vector b.
, where b is of size n and n h is the number of bids of value h in b.
Proof. To prove a lower bound on the difference between the offline revenue max {n, h · n h }, and any auction we define a distribution D on the possible two-values bid vectors {1, h} n . We then show that for any deterministic auction, the expected revenue for a random bid vector b (expectation now is with respect to D), is at most P . On the other hand, we show that the expected revenue of the offline single price (over the distribution D) is at least P + ∆, for some ∆. This implies (by standard averaging argument, see for example [28] ), that for any auction, (including randomized ones), there must be some vector b for which the auction's revenue is ∆ less than the fixed-price offline optimal auction.
The distribution D in our case is quite simple: for every bidder i ∈ [n] independently, set b i = h with probability 1/h and b i = 1 with probability 1 − 1/h. Now, for every deterministic truthful auction, knowing D, the price for every element should better be in [h], otherwise there is another auction that assign prices in [h] and achieves at least the same revenue for every bid vector (the one that assigns 1 for every value less than 1 and h for every value higher than h). Further, for such auction, the revenue is the sum of revenues obtained from the n bidders. Thus the expectation is the sum of expectations of the revenue obtained from the single bidders. Since for bidder i the expectation is exactly 1 (since for any fixed b i the auction must set a constant price α ∈ [h] independent of b i . Hence for α > 1, the expected revenue from bidder i is 1 h · h = 1, and for α = 1 the expected value is clearly 1). We conclude that for every deterministic truthful auction as above, the expected revenue (with respect to D), is exactly n.
We now want to prove that the expected revenue of the fixed-price offline auction, that knows b, is n + Ω( √ hn). We know, however, the exact revenue of such auction for every bid vector b. It is just M (b) = max {n, h · n h (b)}, where n h (b) is the number of h-bids in b.
Thus the expected revenue is
To estimate this sum, it is instructive to examine the following deterministic auction which we note before as DOP . On each vector b, DOP assigns value h for every bidder i for which the number of h-bids in b −i , is at least n/h (we assume n/h is an integer), and 1 otherwise.
On one side, as argued before, the expected revenue of DOP with respect to D is
On the other hand, the same expression, is by definition,
Comparing the expression in Equation (1) and Equation (3), and using Equation (2), we get:
Hence we conclude that the difference in expectation between offline revenue E D [M (b)] and the expected revenue on any deterministic auction, which is n, is,
By Stirling's approximation we know that n n/h = Θ h/n
(1 − 1/h)(1/h) n/h (1 − 1/h) n−n/h Therefore, the additive lost is at least Ω( √ h · n) as claimed.
Discussion
We have presented an existential general derandomization for unlimited supply, unit demand, single item auctions. This derandomization produces an auction with the same asymptotic revenue guarantee as the expected revenue of the randomized. Furthermore, this derandomization is direct (in the sense that no intermediate Bi-valued auctions appeared as examples in several works, such as [2, 15] . We present here a connection between these auctions and a certain hat guessing game [9, 12] . Solving this puzzle optimally results in an optimal deterministic auction for bi-valued auctions. Surprisingly, the establishment of the tight lower bound for these auctions involves analyzing the DOP, the deterministic optimal auctions for i.i.d. inputs.
Our general derandomization suffers from an additive loss of O(h √ n) over the expected revenue of a random auction. Aggarwal et al. [2] proved that every deterministic auction will suffer from an additive loss over the best offline auction, hence did not rule out exact derandomizations. We showed, by the lower bound on bi-valued auctions, that every auction (including a random one) suffers from an additive loss of Ω( √ nh) over the best offline auction. Clearly, our understanding of the additive loss is not complete yet and needs some further investigation.
